It’s well-known that when a pair has a toddler, the typical girl experiences a “child penalty” in labor market outcomes, whereas outcomes for the person are largely unchanged. For a dialogue of this sample utilizing US knowledge, right here’s an article by Jane Waldfogel from again in 1998 within the Journal of Financial Views. As that paper factors out: “As the gender gap in pay between women and men has been narrowing, the ‘family gap’ in pay between mothers and nonmothers has been widening.”
This sample is widespread all over the world. Henrik Kleven, Camille Landais, and Gabriel Leite-Mariante take into account knowledge for 134 international locations in “The Child Penalty Atlas* (published online in The Review of Economic Studies). For those who don’t have enough caffeine in their system at present to tackle the academic paper, the authors have set a “Child Penalty Atlas” web site, with a helpful overview of methodology and findings.
Right here’s the info drawback they face. For a variety of international locations, there may be pretty complete annual knowledge on labor market outcomes and births. Thus, a analysis can observe a fundamental labor market final result like whether or not somebody is within the labor power or not, and the way the sample shifts when a pair’s first little one is born. Right here’s a comparatively widespread sample utilizing knowledge from Chile. Within the years main as much as a primary little one, each women and men usually tend to be holding jobs (maybe becasue they’re leaving faculty). However when the primary little one is born, the employment price for ladies drops off, whereas that for males continues rising a bit, however primarily ranges off.
Nonetheless, many international locations shouldn’t have annual knowledge. As an alternative, they’ve occasional knowledge from a authorities census or family survey. The researchers then take this strategy:
In these circumstances, we all know the age of individuals’s oldest little one, so we all know what occurs to men and women’s employment after having kids. However as a result of we don’t observe the identical individuals over time, we have no idea what their outcomes had been earlier than that they had kids. How will we handle this? In a nutshell, we ‘match’ every noticed particular person who has simply had a primary little one (i.e., they’re at t=0) to a childless particular person with related traits who’s n (n various from 1 to five) years youthful. We then assume that this childless particular person may have a toddler in n years from now. Successfully, we create a inhabitants of “future parents” from the inhabitants of people that don’t have kids and who’re similar to the precise mother and father we observe.
Is that this strategy a smart one? You possibly can examine it. Take the international locations like Chile which have each sorts of information: annual knowledge and occasional census/survey knowledge. Apply this methodology of selecting people who find themselves related in noticed traits based mostly on the occasional knowledge. Then have a look at the annual knowledge and examine whether or not this methodology presents correct projections. It seems that the strategy works fairly properly.
The consequence means that little one penalties fluctuate rather a lot throughout international locations. Because the map exhibits, the discount in ladies’s labor power participation after a primary delivery may be very low in elements of Africa in addition to China and elements of east Asia; intermediate stage within the US, Canada, Russia, and elements of Europe like France; and better in Latin America, elements of the Center East, and elements of Europe.
in lots of high-income international locations the kid penalty explains practically 100% of the hole of the hole in labor power participation between women and men: for instance, it explains 84% of the hole in america, 95% in Canada, 97% in Germany, and greater than 100% of the hole in Sweden. For a lot of different international locations all over the world, the kid penalty is simply a part of the labor power participation hole: in some circumstances, as a result of the kid penalty is so small (as in sure countrie in Africa and Asia), and in different circumstances as a result of the gender hole in labor power participation is so massive (as in Latin America and the Center East).
There’s in fact an ongoing argument in america over the extent to which authorities applications that help first-time mother and father, from work depart to little one care, would possibly scale back the gender hole in labor power participation. The proof right here doesn’t communicate to that time instantly. In spite of everything, many international locations throughout Europe have significantly extra intensive parental depart insurance policies and little one care help than america, but in addition a better little one penalty. Insurance policies to help new mother and father in all probability have a unique impact relying on broader social expectations: if the social expectation is that almost all moms will return to the labor power, these insurance policies would possibly assist the transition out of the labor power and again in; but when the social expectation is that moms not return to the labor power quickly, or in any respect, then parental depart and different helps could clean the trail out of the labor power.
