Mar. 8—PLATTSBURGH — Since Russia’s 13-day invasion of Ukraine, SUNY Plattsburgh’s Dr. Richard Schaefer watches an unimaginable history unfold in real time as Ukrainians fight for their lives and country, and the global community hits Russian President Vladimir Putin and his oligarch cohorts with unprecedented sanctions.
“Though it might be unpopular, I tend to think that European efforts at working with Putin and the Russian government in recent years — though they ultimately failed — were not in themselves wrong,” the professor of history said.
“The goal was always to find ways to avoid conflict. There is really nothing specific that one can point to that warrants saying ‘we should have seen this coming’. Though an invasion was forecast in the days before it happened, there were few if any who really predicted the scale and scope of the current destruction.”
Asked if the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is right to deny a no-fly zone, Schaefer said that “I don’t think they have a choice. The risk of escalation is simply too great.”
EU MEMBERSHIP
Recent media reports suggested that the European Union is considering Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia’s bids to join the EU while support is growing for Sweden and Finland to join NATO.
On that, Schaefer said that “I do not think that accelerated membership in the European Union can or will happen, though it isn’t impossible. The accession process is simply too complex, and involves too many variables. Other eastern European states may push for it, but they are unlikely to be successful.”
Russians in Russia have reportedly continued to protest against the Russian Armed Forces’ invasion of Ukraine despite the risk of arrest and imprisonment while Ukrainians have showed compassion for Russian Prisoners of War.
“I hope very much that the conflict does not lead to blanket anti-Russian sentiment,” Schaefer said. “It is unclear just how much average Russians really know about what is happening, given the high levels of state control over the media.”
Q&A
Asked in a Q&A with the Press-Republican to comment on a number of issues around the conflict, Schaefer gave the following replies.
Answers have been edited for length and brevity.
Q: How much did China know about the invasion in advance? Is Putin counting on Chinese support should the sanctions become more severe (e.g. stopping Russian access to the ‘SWIFT’ network)?
A: I honestly don’t know the answer, but I am betting that the Russian leader must believe he will have alternative tools at his disposal to weather the storm.
Q: Will the Russian people manifest serious opposition?
A: This seems to me of vital importance. Putin has a long history of quelling any, and all opposition and there is no question he can master small demonstrations etc. But will there be large demonstrations? I wouldn’t rule out the possibility of a large-scale opposition movement, though I don’t think it is likely.
Q: Is Putin stuck in a time warp?
A: No. Like all politicians he is making his calculations based on strategic considerations of the moment. He believes that he can subdue Ukraine within 1-2 weeks and that he can weather the political fall-out. That doesn’t mean he isn’t making those decisions against a background of assumptions drawn from history, including the experience of the Soviet Union. But that is true of everyone. That does not constitute a ‘time warp’ as such.
Q: Are we beyond empires in the 21st century?
A: No. History shows that empires rise and fall, and that they can take different forms. They can be as much cultural and economic as political and military. That said, the ‘classical’ form of empire (i.e. sending ships and planting flags in foreign soil) is very much out of fashion. But I certainly wouldn’t rule out the possibility of a new round of empire building in some form in this century or the next.
Q: Is Putin raining down destruction on the Ukraine in another attempt, after the annexation of Crimea, to resurrect the Soviet Union from the ashes of the Cold War?
A: No. The Soviet Union had its origins in an ill-fated but no less sincere attempt to engineer a classless society and start a worldwide revolution that would achieve that end. This ambition was curtailed and revised under Stalin, but never abandoned as such. There is nothing of this kind of deep world-forming ideology in Putin’s vision of Russian regional hegemony. His invasion of Ukraine is guided by a desire to secure a uniformly pro-Russian Ukrainian government, one that takes its cues from Moscow. Like what he has with Belarus.
Q: Will Putin stop there or is this the next stepping stone for further expansion?
A: I did not think he would invade Ukraine, so I am extremely hesitant to make any predictions. With that caveat in mind, I will say that I doubt he has any aspirations of launching military attacks on any NATO country (i.e. former Eastern Bloc neighbors like Poland, Hungary etc.). That would trigger an immediate military response that would entail further escalation the likes of which are truly nightmarish to contemplate… Could he seek to destabilize these countries and erode their place in the fabric of NATO and the West? Yes, and his actions in Ukraine illustrate just how many ways there are of doing this. If he is successful in Ukraine, he might certainly try. But it would take time, and so I do not foresee a quick post-Ukraine invasion of any other neighboring state.
Q: It seems the world moved on, but revenge against the West simmered in Putin’s heart. Why does he to desire to break the West, Western Bloc?
A: I don’t think this is an act of ‘revenge’. Putin is working to secure Russian hegemony and to push-back against NATO expansion. By saying that, I am not seeking to justify his actions. To understand is not to condone. And if I haven’t already said so please let me be clear: I am outraged and heart-broken by these events. That said, Putin is not a fool, and he is not acting out ‘evil’ or ‘demonic’ impulses. Putin views the expansion of NATO as a serious restructuring of the historical space in which Russia has historically been the dominant power.
Q: It seems NATO miscalculated Putin and Russia? China?
A: Yes and no. Since the Russian build-up, NATO warned of an invasion, and it happened. So in that sense they calculated correctly. Also, by expanding into eastern Europe over the last 30 years, you might say they correctly calculated that Russia would be a threat to ‘watch’. So, I don’t think I agree that NATO miscalculated as such. At the same time, you are right to say that deep in the fabric of NATO strategic thinking there were very few who thought that Russia would launch this kind of all-out assault on Ukraine. But if I’m honest, I don’t think there were very many in Russia who thought this likely either. It will be interesting what we learn in the future about just what Russian military commanders did and did not know, and when.
I will not comment on China.
Q: The EU and NATO appear weak?
A: The EU — yes. They have neither means nor the conviction to mount a military response. NATO has never been tested. Member states pledge themselves to defend each other in case of attack. Putin know this, and it is one reason he wants to prevent Ukraine from becoming a NATO member…..would he consider attacking a NATO member? That would be a terrible gamble. I tend to think not, but I could be wrong.
Q: Would you say that sanctions alone aren’t going to work as punishment for this conflict, and that Putin, obviously, could care less? That he understands fighting fire with fire.
A: I think that sanctions can be very powerful tools, but they will not ‘stop’ the invasion. I think Putin is counting on subduing Ukraine within 1-2 weeks, and that he can weather global condemnations and sanctions for 3-6 months. However, sanctions can trigger serious economic hardship in Russia. But they also hurt Europe, and to an extent the United States, and I am not convinced that the average European or American is willing to suffer the consequences that would follow from a serious regimen of sanctions. As to Putin ‘not caring’ — I think he certainly is mindful of what sanctions can do and how it can affect ordinary Russians and how this poses a potential problem for him. But he is confident he can manage these problems. I do not think he is worried about Russians mobilizing en masse to call for his ouster. He has a lot of experience cowing protestors into submission. Does he only understand force? Sadly, I think he tends to view anything short of force as an expression of weakness, yes.
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